Remember the timeline of events
Once they became available, I read through the released emails and instant messages from the House Committee investigation to understand the context in which they were made. The most egregious statements which received the most press, e.g. the phrase "Jedi Mind Trick" and "is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys", have absolutely no relationship to MCAS functionality, and are immaterial to the case against Forkner. So your assessment here is absolutely correct.
What the majority of people and the press continue to fail to grasp is the timeline of events. The criminal case against Forkner begins in November 2016 when he inadvertently in the simulator learns of the changed functionality of MCAS from the high speed regime to the low speed regime. It was during flight test in March 2016 where MCAS was changed from a system that used two dis-similar sensors--a G-sensor and Angle-of-Attack--operating at high speed to a system that relied only on the AoA sensor operating throughout the flight envelope. This change in functionality was not formally communicated by the 737Max Program to the Technical Pilots which reside in a separate business unit. This explains why MCAS was permitted to be removed from mention in the FCOM which also occurs in March 2016. Forkner signs off on this document believing that the MCAS system had limited capability and operated only within a corner point of the flight envelope.
This is fundamentally a failure in maintaining airplane configuration control first-and-foremost. It was a change that was hurried through without sufficient review. Importantly because finding compliance to MCAS was delegated by the FAA to Boeing AR/DER/O-EMs, this change was also not properly communicated back to the FAA regulators.
According to the consent decree, Forkner knowingly misrepresents the capability of MCAS to the AEG after accidentally finding out about the change in the November 2016 simulator session. This is the basis for the criminal charges of fraud. Fundamentally, the regulatory system should not have to rely upon serendipitous events to ensure safety. The timeline of events indicates that this was the case.
From my perspective, Forkner is being made the scapegoat for poorly written software, poor engineering decisions and poor program management. Boeing is still at fault here.