I’ll take Engines’ mention of me as an invitation to try to answer the same (excellent) questions, from my viewpoint and own experiences.
1. What would have been expected of me if I’d been given an order to ‘suborn’ airworthiness?
When given such an illegal order I was expected, and legally bound, to challenge it. I have been given illegal orders by civilians and senior officers of two Services.
Two examples of more serious events.
When told by a civilian in 1999 to make a false declaration in airworthiness documents, I refused. He went bleating to a senior RN officer; who confirmed my refusal was an offence, and warranted a formal warning. This was upheld by our 2 Star (i/c Chinook, Nimrod, etc.), the Chief of Defence Procurement, and two Cabinet Secretaries. His decision stood, and the protection this afforded the civilian is directly linked to nine deaths – 6xRN, 1xUSN and 2xRAF. However, I have never received an illegal order from an RN officer.
In 1992 an Air Vice Marshal deemed the same refusal a dismissible offence. My sacking was avoided by Director Internal Audit, in a report to PUS, giving AML/Chief Engineer both barrels. The events preceding this form the background to the ‘savings at the expense of safety’ confirmed by the Nimrod Review; and so are linked to scores of deaths.
2. Why didn’t senior RN engineers confront their RAF equivalents about the issues with the Chinook Mk2?
I know of two senior RN officers, both I think known to Engines, who railed against the RAF policy of running down airworthiness. Both were Senior Captains; one, in FONAC, wrote saying AMSO’s policies were an ‘indictment on the way we conduct business’. Doesn’t sound like much, but it was more than most and the target was a 4 Star. But a mere Senior Captain is going to be ignored if he doesn’t have top cover.
I also recall that the letters of airworthiness delegation from AML/Chief Engineer (from April 1994) only allowed you to report problems in your own little area. That is, he didn’t want to know about systemic failures. Again, many deaths occurred as a direct result of the CE ignoring these warnings, mainly from Directors of Flight Safety. As the Government confirmed on ZD576, very senior RAF officers cannot be wrong by virtue of their rank.
3. How did the actions of senior RAF officers lead to the FAA’s own airworthiness issues?
Historically, the RN was content for suitably qualified and experienced civilians to carry out many roles the RAF demanded its own officers do. In 1991 they were transferred to AMSO, subject to RAF policies, and one step further removed from the RN. The RAF ensured they had no voice by shutting down the oversight committees chaired by these civilians in June 1991.
But it is also necessary to say the run-down of the FAA, and some 2 Star posts becoming 1 Star, meant, for example, the Sea King AEW Mk7 MAR was signed in August 2002 by an Air Vice Marshal, DGES(Air), and the RTS by CINCFLEET – a very significant change from the period related by Engines in a previous post. The project office technical staff had been stood down in March 2001, and technical leadership assumed by a civilian physiologist – who was permitted to self-delegate airworthiness and technical approvals. When XV650 and XV704 collided on 22 March 2003, the Mission System had the same status as Chinook Mk2 in 1994 – not to be relied upon in any way. Due to various interactions, this affected Comms, Nav, IFF and more. Also, the RTS allowed the use of equipment that had been prohibited in the aircraft since 1998 on safety grounds; and both aircraft had mandatory safety mods missing – again, same as Chinook. Whoever wrote that RTS had no idea whatsoever about RN Sea Kings or the Mk7 programme; but even now I find it astonishing that the squadron, at least, didn’t point these things out. The aircraft wasn’t sufficiently mature, but it was frustratingly close. The problem was not necessarily the need for more time; it was that the above non-engineer had cancelled risk mitigation contracts; and these 3 known risks manifested on the same day and were deemed the 3 main contributory factors by the Board.
A bloody mess, and I wish the MAA well should they ever decide to try to do something.