Lessons to be learned / Issues to be understood
Lessons to be learned / Issues to be understood:-
Specifically brief GA procedures which require lower altitude level-off than normally encountered. Also those procedures requiring a turn which could be coincident with alt acquire.
Review training methods for predictive WS GA, compare this with reactive windshear requiring a full escape manoeuvre. Could the training for the warnings mislead crews (considering them to be the same), overlooking that PWS is constrained by ATC procedure with Alt limits, whereas Reactive WS mandates climb until safety is assured.
Would either of the trained procedures conflict with airport procedures; PWS GA level off, Reactive WS ignore procedural restrictions - climb for safety.
How would ATC know the difference between GA due to predictive wind-shear and a reactive WS GA.
What reaction / clearance might the crew expect; ATC reaction, surprise for some, startle for others. Follow SOPs, except …
Consider cognitive dissidence between WS GA mental model requiring continued climb vs Alt alerting - level off during a predictive warning. Cognitive overload - cognitive incapacitation - unable to change focus of attention, reconsider the situation, attempting to resolve which procedure to use, when.
Review WS checklists involving the above.
Identify misleading - incorrect terminology for Alerts (amber) and Warning (red).
Not to place ‘notes’ before boxed memory items (dual use; checklists-for-real vs checklists in ground school training vice other documents).
Also any caveat that a red warning can be ignored - requiring further, delaying situation assessment - more mental workload.
Check if Red is always used for Predictive WS displays - red warning in PFD, but some other colour on ND / Radar.
Review Pprune mindset re ‘blame’, ‘incompetence’, etc; judgement cannot be made unless we were there, and even those who were, may be unable to provide reasoning for their actions (human condition).
Last edited by safetypee; 17th Jul 2021 at 21:44.