Any NATO procurement should be a ground-up program with full transparency and financially backed OEM performance guarantees on;
- Configuration control with individual pricing for each capability or system
- Design standards
- Systems commonality
- Configured helicopter price
- Program price
- Delivery schedule
- In-service schedule
- Operational hourly price
- Flight Training
- Maintenance Training
- Support package pricing
- Availability guarantees
- Reliability guarantees
- Helicopter operational performance guarantees
- Unresolved AOG and non-availability penalties
- Supportability and Obsolescence strategies
If this is to be a standardised NATO platform, there should be a single multi-nation NATO office to provide fleet management control and provide a sole point of contact with the selected OEM to manage every part of the fleet, including monitoring and controlling all of the above items. This doesn't stop the individual operating entity from engaging directly with the OEM, but does standardize configuration and option pricing and support so the ability to gouge or take advantage of individual customers with "special deals" which are rarely beneficial to the operator.
The failure of so many of these platforms is the completely failed procurement process utilized by individual governments filled with bureaucrats who have no idea what they are talking about, and get bamboozled by OEM salesmen who talk them into a never-ending list of idiotic concepts and requirements as they "shape" the procurement to meet their own product whether it meets the requirement or not. It doesn't matter if you are looking at the US Presidential VH-71, the NH90, CH-148 Cyclone or the MH-139A or any other programme - something is completely wrong with the process. It's time to take control of an essential airborne capability, that according to various published reports is so entirely dysfunctional that there are huge holes in strategic defence capabilities, leaving countries incapable of meeting their basic rotary wing requirements.
The OEM is quick to blame the operating entity, saying that they didn't procure adequate parts or services, which leaves them grounded because the parts aren't available because they didn't procure them, and the OEM doesn't stock them, and the lead time is 2 years (or whatever). This may well be correct, but the procurement should never have proceeded without full visibility to the primary acquisition cost, and full visibility to the sustainment costs and binding commitments from all parties to adequate sustainment planning and financing, and guarantees from the OEM to availability of parts and service, with controls on pricing. No aquisition should be permitted without an approved operating plan and fully funded budget. For anyone who doubts this might work, then take a look at the commercial world, where OEM provided PBH or equivalents have become the norm on modern platforms. If the helicopter fails to meet any of the required performance points, then start applying penalties. Really BIG penalties - that is the only way to get things done in this industry.
In the current market the Customer has complete control of the transaction and terms, lay them out and the OEM's will all still be there. There is nothing wrong with new platforms and technologies, but there needs to be an appropriate process to assign the risk (and expense) to the supplier who has committed to supplying it.
It's an embarrassment to the entire industry and as a taxpayer, it's a rip-off!