Originally Posted by
rotorspeed
As ever, very good take on all of this. But did Ara really not have a current IR? And I guess even if he did, an issue would be his IMC currency. Pretty extraordinary to be flying an S76 without surely?
None of the pilot's proficiency check records published by the NTSB (since 2014) show FAR 135.297 Pilot in command: Instrument proficiency check.
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...dacted-Rel.pdf
Originally Posted by
rotorspeed
And does anyone know what the weather was like at the intended destination? And how would Ara have known that - was there a nearby airfield with met reporting? How much further did he have to run? One of the biggest risk areas of ops to private sites in poor weather is uncertainty of weather there. Reports from particularly non pilots are to be given little weight in my experience.
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Weather reports from airports (CMA destination airport, VNY closest airport to crash site):
At 0851 PST, (prior to departure) VNY reported a calm wind, visibility of two and a half statute miles, haze, ceiling overcast at 1,100 feet agl,
At 0905 PST (just prior to departure), CMA reported a wind from 080° at 7 knots, visibility of 4 statute miles, haze, ceiling overcast at 1,600 feet agl,
At 0951 PST, (about 5 minutes after the crash) VNY reported a calm wind, visibility of two and a half statute miles, haze, ceiling overcast at 1,300 feet agl,
At 0955 PST (about 10 minutes after the crash), CMA reported a wind from 030° at 3 knots, visibility of 4 statute miles, haze, ceiling overcast at 1,700 feet agl,
During the NTSB Board meeting the investigators said that at the time of departure the forecast flight conditions were within company specified limits, but that the visibility less than 3 miles at VNY should have resulted in the pilot consulting with the Director of operations and the SVFR should have required an alternative plan.
I'll add that in looking at the NTSB provided ADS-B data, which includes GEO altitude, I can see that the pilot was squeezed to ~300' AGL going over the U.S. 101 pass near Mureau Rd (this pass is the highest point on his planned route). After the pass, the helicopter maintains ~300' AGL for a few seconds as the road (and the helicopter) descend ~150', then the pilot climbs to "get above the layers". I hypothesize that the pilot's plan was to get over the pass and descend underneath the cloud base to complete the flight scud running, but that conditions on the other side of the pass were not what he expected. A witness told the NTSB: "The cloud that the aircraft entered and disappeared into was a thick wall that extended as low as about ten feet above ground and upward beyond visibility. This low cloud started at about the Juan Bautista de Anza East Trailhead, heading west. This trailhead starts at the end of Calabasas Rd. When I first spotted the aircraft, the clouds were relatively higher than the cloud I watched it disappear into. I couldn't guess the altitude of the higher cloud line but it was lower than a police helicopter would fly when closely circling a person on foot over a residential neighborhood in West Hills, CA. It appeared that the aircraft was flying at a level which had visibility until it entered the cloud wall."