Two Fifty,
Your statement might have some validity if Airservices had all the following:
- staff that actually understood how the STCA worked,
- detailed operational concepts and concept of operations of the STCA application in varying airspace types,
- accurate records of how often the STCA alert went off at each functional sector per day,
- accurate records of how often a STCA alert prompted the controller to intervene where they had not previously,
- a detailed understanding of the current shortcoming of the STCA software in TAAATS Eurocat,
- standardisation of application across Australian airspace specific to varying airspace requirements (noted above)
- recording evidence where the STCA is being perceived and/or used as a controller tool rather that a system safety net,
etc etc etc
But I'm sorry. If you'd care to find out you'd be disappointed.
MNG apparently did not have any STCA Inhibtion area.
Therefore I don't doubt and have to at least question your premise...
What altitude would you use as the ceiling if it was going to have ? What altitude would you use as the ceiling of the STCA Inhibition area when MNG becomes a SAFIS in ? G airspace after proposed AsA changes are implemented?
You may be further surprised (if your rationale has logic) to find that there are few if any G Airsapace aerodromes with STCA Inhibtion areas in Melbourne Centre.
So your comment "Alarms...they would be going on off all the time"....Yep that is exactly what has been happening for years.
Some G airspace controllers according to my sources are being exposed to FALSE OPERATIONAL POSITIVES of Short Term Conflicts Alerts of between 99 to 99.9 percent. Yes only 1 in a 1000 STCA alerts is relevant to where the controller is prompted to action...
So after a while the safety net becomes a safety issue itself, the STCA is ignored or is confirming what the controller has already done....
We could be better than this...sigh!