The Malaysian AAIB report agreed with the captain’s declaration to reject the takeoff was well taken since the captain said it was unsafe to continue considering the airport surrounding terrain and bad weather.
That said, some would argue the sound of the configuration warning at V1 was so inconsequential that a continued takeoff was a safer option than a high speed abort beyond V1 on a wet runway.
The Boeing report at Appendix 5 of the AAIB investigation made the following observations of the conduct of the abort. The aircraft had already passed the V1 of 141 knots when the captain initiated the abort. The QAR indicated the abort commenced ten knots after V1 – namely 151 knots which put the aircraft further down the runway which was already wet. The maximum speed reached was 154 knots before reducing. That is 13 knots beyond V1
The captain immediately overrode the RTO feature by using manual braking as the auto brakes actuated. The RTO feature applied instant 3000 PSI but this was reduced to 800 PSI the instant the captain applied manual braking. It gradually increased to 3000 PSI over the next 20 seconds. . Full reverse was not used.
Boeing stated: “During RTO, reverse thrust, wheel brakes and autobrake were used; however not to their maximum capability. Reverse detent was used instead of maximum reverse which would have been expected on a wet runway and commanded brake pressure was reduced from the autobrake applied brake pressure of 3000 PSI to 800 PSI and gradually increased back to maximum brake pressure over 20 seconds.”
To an informed observer it would appear the decision by the captain to abort beyond V1 was more a panic move rather than a fully considered decision of all the circumstances. If, as the captain stated, a takeoff configuration warning occurred as the aircraft passed V1, there is little doubt that there would have been a WTF moment startle factor and a momentary delay before he elected to continue the takeoff or reject.
It is doubtful if the captain at the time of the takeoff configuration warning, would have found the time to consider terrain and weather before making an informed decision. More likely he made a snap decision to abort. But why stop?
The fact he dithered with the speed brake handle after V1 would indicate he was caught by surprise while still accelerating. Maybe he hoped it would stop the configuration warning which was distracting. When the noise didn't stop he then instinctively initiated an abort because he didn't know what else to do.
Regardless of his handling errors during the abort which would suggest a degree of technical incompetency, it would appear that to the casual observer there could be only one reason for his action to abort beyond V1.
The captain’s considered on the spot opinion that the aircraft may not fly in terms of possible handling difficulties and unknown gradient of climb.
Or: A startle or WTF factor so strong that standard operating procedure as espoused by the aircraft manufacturer in the flight manual was overridden by the captain's primeval desire to stay on the ground regardless of stopping performance considerations. In other words a panic driven abort which fortunately caused no casualties. What do readers think?
Last edited by sheppey; 28th Jan 2021 at 11:59.