gums, re your post #19,
Apologies for my my cryptic #13 which was a reference to your previous post '13' in this thread, minimising thread clutter with endless quotes.
We are dancing around the same pole; but without the details of the various factors which could have influenced the goals of the people involved we cannot know their reasoning.
A minor deficiency in certification stick-force requirement could be argued with the regulator, normally the first choice - low cost. We don't know the extent of the deficiency, likely the wrong side of the line with Mach effects.
However, the second goal - NG compatibility, minimum training, then at $1M per aircraft there would be a strong incentive to improve the MAX. Particularly where the cost of MCAS as an extension of the existing STS would be small beer in the overall certification costs.
Amongst these goals it is feasible that MCAS might not be required for certification, but for commonality - training, MCAS was essential. A typical situation of conflicting goals, commercial pressures, and time constraint, cobbled together and thrown at the regulator.
Maybe the 'MAX did not required MCAS, but it had it.'
Yes Boeing are paying for this misjudgement - hard cash; the FAA can only 'pay' with loss of reputation, credibility, and worldwide trust. Which of these two, Boeing / FAA, will be back in 'profit' first ?
Flown the F101 Voodoo?! But for the toss of a coin I would have. However, the long-stab characteristics were closely studied, being typical of that generation of transonic aircraft. Extensive experience in 'the' Lightning which had similar, mild characteristics, showed how tolerant or unaware pilots can be of adverse characteristics.
These aircraft required 'MCAS', but didn't have it.