Originally Posted by
OK465
I may be in error, but in contrast as far as I can tell, I can find no Eurofighter Typhoon crashes fatal or otherwise this year. What is that attributable to?
Lack of reporting?, fewer hours flown, more hours flown?, less simulation, more simulation?, more supervision, less supervision, better supervision?, more experience, less experience?, less demanding employment, more demanding employment?, newer machine, mature machine?, better COVID protocols?
Better luck?
Obviously difficult to draw any conclusions from small sample size but the F15 and the Shaw F16 mishaps both seem to show the USAF maintaining a high level of ambition in the training of its junior pilots, which to my impression is not being matched by any Typhoon operator. Poor supervision and more demanding employment are potentially the same thing; trouble is, as long as a majority of group and squadron commanders cross their fingers and hope that their units escape mishap for a couple of years instead of down-declaring certain roles, a moment of reckoning will only come when some outside agency forces an assessment of the rising accident rate.
I'm also not a fan of the USAF's 'operational risk management' system, which applies a tick-box approach to sortie content and produces a score which indicates the level of authorisation required. For one thing it reduces the need for junior supervisors to think and judge for themselves, and they need to learn that somehow. For another it opens the possibility of a simple arithmetical or process error (as in the Shaw case) allowing something to proceed that clearly should not have. I know that some RAF units have dabbled in this approach but by and large supervision is predominantly still judgement-based. That's not to say that the UK approach is flawless; far from it in fact.