Interesting debate! I'll let others have their say as that's just my view!
Simulator instructors in the job full time could write a book on what they occasionally witness in the horror box. But the risk of hurt feelings and subsequent danger of litigation are always there. There was one event I saw however, that will forever stick in my mind. The automation was perfect but it was the flight crew handling of an unexpected slight technical defect that was the worry. This event convinced me not only of the pressing need for airline pilots to maintain raw data manual flying competency but of the ever present insidious effect in some countries of ethnic culture when it comes to flight safety mores.
I was briefed to give experienced military trained crews of a large Asian country two hours of general handling on the Boeing 737 Classic simulator. An interpreter was provided who sat on the jump seat while I occupied the instructor panel position. Part of the exercise was a standard ILS procedurally flown. The first thing I noticed after takeoff was both pilots flew with their hands firmly on their knees from the time the captain engaged the autopilot to the end of the session. After any autopilot mod selection their hands went straight back to the knees.
During the autopilot flying via a DME arc to intercept the localiser, I asked the interpreter to tell the captain (PF) it might be wise to have one hand on the thrust levers during the ILS rather than both hands on his knees. This advice was obviously rejected by the captain who was chief pilot of the company. As the aircraft was descending during the DME arc the autothrottle had commanded the thrust levers to idle. Speed was initially 210 knots clean. IMC conditions prevailed. Nil wind. On the instructor panel I actuated failure of the No 1 engine throttle clutch motor. There is no QRH item for this type of fault as it would be considered normal good airmanship to pick up any split between the two thrust levers when it occurred.
At the appropriate time in the ILS, the PF requested flap and gear extension and the PM made the selections and placed his hands back on his knees. As airspeed was reduced and drag increased, the autothrottle system increased power to maintain correct approach speed. However only the No 2 thrust lever moved. The No 1 thrust lever remained at idle because its clutch motor was inoperative. The autopilot now coupled to the ILS, applied significant aileron to stop the increasing asymmetric roll due to one engine at idle thrust and the other engine at 75% N1 trying to maintain selected speed. Rudder pedals were central as they were not part of the autopilot. Both pilots had their hands still on their knees and not a word passed between them despite the obvious indications of something drastically wrong.
Midway down the ILS I tapped the interpreter on the shoulder and in English told her to tell the captain to look at the throttles which had a large split, as well has the control wheel showing 45 degrees of roll application. Hardly had the interpreter done so when the autopilot decided enough was enough and disengaged itself. The aircraft began a rapid roll to the left and the nose dropped. Despite this, both pilots kept their hands on their knees and said nothing. The captain seeing the closed left throttle then announced "Engine Failure - checklist" in his native language but made no attempt to manually correct the increasing roll and spiral dive. He kept his hands on his knees and his feet on the rudders but without applying any correction.
The PF groped around to locate the QRH which was on the floor next to him. He frantically flipped the pages of the QRH while seemingly oblivious to the flight instruments indication of 60 degrees angle of bank, a high rate of dsecent, a GPWS warning and the closed throttle of No 1 engine and the high power indication of No 2 engine. All the while, the captain who seemed frozen in indecision kept his own hands on his knees shouting in his own language "Checklist - Checklist - Hurry up - hurry up!"
It was now clear to me that crew coordination had completely broken down and the aircraft would crash within seconds. I "froze" the simulator, lowered the drawbridge and told the interpreter to have the crew meet me in the coffee room for a chat. Frankly, I was at loss for words. These two pilots included the chief pilot and if he couldn't fly a 737 then what of the rest of the ten pilots who had come a long way to use my company's full flight simulator. The interpreter who spoke perfect English was equally dismayed; after all he was going to be the bearer of bad news to the captain. The interpreter was in an invidious position. I envisaged him being shot or worse, as a witness to a calamity in the simulator.
I decided it would be better for all concerned to run a completely neutral de-briefing and carefully avoid any criticism of either pilot. Loss of face in their culture was important to avoid. I did say, however, it was probably a good idea for the PF to retain one hand on the throttles during an instrument approach. The captain briefly nodded his head after the interpreter had passed on this advice. while the PM sipped his coffee with one hand and kept the other hand on his knee. In some parts of the world, cultural mores win over flight safety every time..