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Old 23rd Nov 2020, 00:40
  #95 (permalink)  
Two's in
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
 
Join Date: Jun 2005
Location: U.S.A.
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The primary difference between Special Operations and regular forces is not, as some on here think, the ability to crawl 10 miles across broken glass with a Commando dagger clenched firmly between their teeth. It is actually the ability to operate remotely in small teams, usually without being detected, working largely autonomously to a high level mission objective, while being able to adapt and overcome when the situation demands. Of course fitness plays a huge role, and having the right (non-standard) equipment, but having the intellect to change the plan when it all goes wrong and complete the mission sits above all the physical stuff. The team structure is naturally NCO heavy, and the (Junior Officer) JO troop commanders rely on that experience, often leading to a reverse command structure. Special Operations are a career enabler for JO's but are not usually an end in itself.

The fact that thousands of Special Operators do this job year in and year out with rarely a glitch, is a testament to their training, integrity and professionalism. But clearly, that's not always the case.

When Steven Mitchell ("Andy McNab") published Bravo Two Zero, detailing his exploits with the SAS during the first Gulf war, he was at the beginning of a trend to "tell-all" and tear away some of the mystique surrounding Special Operations. The public (and the rest of the Forces) lapped all this up, and it was undoubtedly a useful recruiting tool to allow this warrior ethos to be cultivated and to build up this image of "men of steel" who always get the job done and never lose. This created a reputation that was often on a knife edge between people who get the job done, and hooligans who can't or won't be told differently. The US Navy SEALs were a text book example of how badly things can go wrong.

On May 2nd 2011 in Abbottbad, Pakistan, US Navy SEALs attacked a compound containing Osama Bin Laden, who was shot and killed during the operation. Not unlike the SAS hostage rescue at the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980, this was an amazing feat of military prowess and SEALs quite rightly rode in on that reputation for getting the job done, despite what you may throw at them. That wave of superiority lasted for less than 7 years. In March 2018 the first complaints of war crimes committed by the Platoon leader, Chief Gallagher, were made to the SEAL Chain of Command (COC) . Note - The initial complaints were made by Gallagher's own platoon, not dissimilar to the Australian SAS complaints. Unfortunately, the US Navy SEAL's COC acted like any elite club with protected membership and they initially ignored or dismissed the complaints. By the time the scope and scale of Gallagher's actions were acknowledged, serious damage had occurred to the reputation of the SEALs. The trial became a politically motivated clown show, but the **** stuck well and hard. Then the following year allegations of widespread drug use and sexual assaults by SEALs (and other Special Operators) led to a widespread safety stand down of a large part of the US Special Operations Command, a large number of the allegations were upheld, especially widespread Cocaine use.

So if as it seems, even Special Operators are subject to the same weaknesses and impulses as everybody else, it follows that they need to be trained to a standard that accounts for their largely autonomous operations (they are) but that there must always be a high degree of self-supervision and integrity. This is where SNCOs are supposed to provide that impregnable barrier. Much more so than in a standard Army role, the SNCOs are the absolute corporate conscience of Special Operations along with providing the continuity and experience. This is where the arguments for firing the Australian Chain of Command miss the target. There is certainly a level of required awareness up the chain, but when you have deliberately created a cadre of self-regulating SNCOs, don't be surprised of nobody beyond Lt Col has a clear view of what goes on in that Unit - it's part of the design.

The actual incident requires no comment, other than it is a travesty and a betrayal of Special Operators everywhere. But please don't play the old "poor old Tommy, been let down by the brass" card, when it is very obvious that the accused have simply discovered that actions always have consequences. There's always a day of reckoning when you start to believe your own publicity.
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