nicknamepilot,
Your conclusions about piloting performance and training suggest bias; without any supporting evidence of what was trained, what the crew knew, what was recalled or not.
Furthermore, the narrow viewpoint fails to consider the overall context of the accident and preceding events of the flight.
The crew were faced with a surprising situation after lift off with several simultaneous system alerts.
Stick shake might have been priority; - having established safe flight, then considered airspeed disagree which might suggest unreliable airspeed.
It is assumed that crew had sufficient understanding of the situation for adequate control at that time.
Only when the flaps were retracted did the trim abnormality - MCAS failure, appear; without alerting, or prior knowledge of an unknown system.
Trim change is cued to pilots as a change in stick force, trim is used to counter this, as would be done for flap retraction. Stick force also changes with airspeed, and even thought the crew used trim, the aircraft did not respond as expected. If (a further assumption), the previous, strong understanding of unreliable airspeed dominated awareness then the unexpected trim changes could have been related to speed error. There may have been doubt that the aircraft was flying at the correct speed, thus maintain thrust, etc, and thereafter the situation deteriorated, the crew struggling to update previous understandings to deduce a failure of an unrelated system which no one knew about. Thence …
Blame is a useful point of closure for weak understanding of human processes. We dislike the unknown uncertainty and often insert items situational factors only known with hindsight, into a hypothetical situation which we form to provide closure; i.e. why we wouldn't make similar errors in the same situation - yet we don't know.
Why then conclude that the crew knew.
Last edited by alf5071h; 28th Oct 2020 at 09:02.