"It is worth noting that the pilot has been given a Cessna 441 endorsement from an external provider - a cost cutting measure by the aircraft operator."
Slight point of order... the operator engaged external training organisations to provide training that they had no qualifications or expertise to deliver themselves - in the pre-COVID world, not an uncommon practice amongst such operators & to be honest - a reasonable way for them to gain some external input to value-add to their operation, if they had a generative / proactive safety culture... Though I imagine now, with the current state of industry, that they have no shortage of options to provide that training in-house, if they have ended up employing pilots displaced from the majors who have previous experience on these types of aircraft. The decision by that operator to disengagewith established external training providers would more likely be the cost-cutting measure insinuated by the OP...
"What in the name of common sense was a 600 hour total time pilot, flying single pilot with FIFO workers."
Not sure about the single-pilot thing - I thought all this FIFO stuff was done "multi-crew". But - there should be no real issue with a 600 hr pilot in the seat, especially two pilot, provided the training, mentoring & oversight is present - but once again, other factors are possibly in play...
"...LBY was a crappy heap of **** back in early years 2000"
Can't argue with that. However, the C441 life extension concept has been adopted for a few airframes around the country & these machines have operated without issue for quite a while - I'm not sure how what appears to possibly be a failed emergency exit causes the modification itself to come into question - but perhaps the operator's maintenance practices are possibly lacking - let's wait & see.
What I'd really be interested to know is how one draws a potentially compromised airframe down to a pressurisation system failure that can be MEL'ed?? I would suggest that the pressurisation worked just fine (that's why the frame split!), as did the auto-deploy oxygen system - possibly it is the emergency exit / airframe that failed & the aircraft probably should not have been operated on further sectors without detailed inspection. Perhaps it is the operational decisions / organisational culture to "MEL" & operate without engineering inspection (which delegate actually gave that instruction?) that is the heart of this issue. Maybe the aircraft should have returned to Broome (80 nm away at time of failure, according to OP) rather than continuing some 300 nm further on to a remote site without any real resources / support? After the emergency descent that the POH calls for, I imagine the pax had a wonderful time sitting there wondering what was going on for the next 1.5 hrs... especially if the pilot was unable / not inclined to engage with them as the OP has suggested. If the pilot was by himself, with only 600 hrs, I'd imagine that a DP event as described above would be a fairly significant challenge & it's (somewhat) to his credit that the aircraft returned at all - more experienced pilots have mishandled DP events to far more tragic outcomes. Hopefully now that this incident has been brought into the light, we might get to learn how all this came about without the sense of apparent disgruntled-ness of the OP's comments above - it's quite possibly more about culture, oversight & operational decision making than a "simple" aircraft defect / failure.
But as Rookie said - definitely an interesting read - and possibly fiction (at least to some extent), but given previous well publicised events involving this operator (and aircraft) I wouldn't be surprised to hear that this is another classic case study in operational culture & the influence of management in the safety of operations.