FullWings, helpful inputs.
A core issue re MCAS it that no specific checklist was published; Boeing assumed that the existing trim-runaway drill would be used, which assumed situation recognition (*1 page 125).
The tests and evaluations identified the criticality of timely response - diagnose and act with 10 sec; yet the first 3-4 sec were 'certification-inactivity', and then 1 sec later (5 sec elapsed) the trim movement by design stopped. MCAS was reset; the human similarly 'reset' because trim movement was normal. There was no trigger feature to assess the situation as a failure.
The congressional findings are more damming;-
'In 2012, Boeing developed initial concepts for an MCAS annunciator to inform pilots when the MCAS failed, but never implemented it.' (*2 page 8).
and from page 10,
'
Boeing’s own analysis showed that if pilots took more than 10 seconds to identify and respond to a “stabilizer runaway” condition caused by uncommanded MCAS activation the result could be catastrophic. The Committee has found no evidence that Boeing shared this information with the FAA, customers, or 737 MAX pilots'.
'The 10-second reaction time and the potential for it to result in catastrophic consequences was discovered early on in the development of the 737 MAX program.'
* 1
http://s3.documentcloud.org/document...rch-9-2020.pdf
* 2
https://transportation.house.gov/imo...rch%202020.pdf