Originally Posted by
Fursty Ferret
The report seems to overlook the fact that TOGA buttons are a stupid design in the first place, especially with FADEC. Regardless of your opinion of Airbus non-moving thrust levers, this is an aspect they got absolutely spot on.
Go-around = firewall the thrust levers. None of this messing around with buttons (accidentally disconnecting the AT instead of TOGA and vice-versa is still a common problem), and you can get rid of the utterly pointless “HOLD” mode that’s a hangover from **** design* in the 70s.
Fursty, as a bus driver I am in complete agreement with your sentiment. However, the report did not overlook the poor design at all. The investigation can't really tell Boeing their system is junk. That would be apportioning blame which is not the idea of accident investigation. They did highlight several shortcomings in the combination of system & procedure. Boeing will have some thinking to do after reading the report but, unfortunately, will probably follow their standard line of pilots should know what they are doing in order to avoid any product liability.
“The Operator in question here does not allow the use of manual thrust, or raw data, at all.”
in this case neither pilot realized that the wheels had touched down and Auto Go Round had been inhibited, there must be cases where GA has to be done after touch down, therefore manual thrust would have to be used.
Is inhibiting auto throttle as soon as the gear touches down a good idea and why is it not cancelled when the GA button is pressed
That aside, because following through every automatic action monitoring becomes casual, in a Go Around situation which is uncommon I would be on those throttles immediately as would any GA pilot, rules or no rules.
DS10, the reason the TOGA switches are disabled on the ground is to prevent problems when they are triggered accidently during ground operations.But yeah, that is a bandaid on a very poor design.