PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - NYT: How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’
Old 22nd Jan 2020, 09:58
  #65 (permalink)  
fdr
 
Join Date: Jun 2001
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Originally Posted by the_stranger
Shouldn't the MEL have been sufficient information to not use the autothrust?

As a known complaint, with two siccesful flight before, surely they had that information of they did their job?
MMEL:

22-04 Autothrottle Systems C/1/0.
May be inoperative provided approach minimums do not require its use.

34-20-01 Radio Altimeter Systems

20-01-03. C/2/1 (M)(O) May be inoperative deactivated provided:
a) Approach minimums or operating procedures do not require its use,
b) Associated autopilot is not used for approach and landing,
c) Autothrottle is not used for approach and landing, and
d) Associated flight director is not used for approach and landing.
NOTE: During takeoff with one radio altimeter inoperative, the flight directors and autopilot should be controlled by the FCC on the same side as the valid radio altimeter (i.e., the first flight director and/or autopilot to be engaged must be receiving valid radio altitude data).

TK1951's fault was an airborne fault, and the MEL (a subset of the MMEL above) is not specifically applicable at that time, any NNCL or abnormal checks would apply. The MMEL hints to the interaction of an RA and the AT, but it isn't a glaringly obvious relationship when encountered at 500' AGL.
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