Robert P, #150, re world-wide certification group.
The likelihood of world-wide regulation depends on the outcome of the existing group’s findings on the 737 Max.
National certification requirements either have the same basis or are sufficiently similar to form a consensus. Differences are more likely in interpretation; this could be influenced by experience and language (culture) - a risk even across the Atlantic - a significant problem in some areas, particularly in local operational application.
Inexperienced or new regulators should gain from exchanges within a group (more than currently done), but also the historical leaders of certification from alternative national special conditions, which invite explanation and discussion - benefiting both regulators and manufacturers.
Agree - the FAA STC process is weak and open to misuse - similarly DER; these would benefit revision using a world view. Also ‘grandfather’ rights could be improved, but his might not be such a major issue as implied by some Pprune views of the 737.
One UK manufacturer required all STCs to be approved by their design and airworthiness, and flight test as necessary. Any vendor or operator bypassing this, or STC rejected by the OEM, was forced to hold all of the responsibility for change - that tended to sharpen up certification practices.
The future relationship between FAA and Boeing, or any other pairing, will change in the aftermath of the Max, but the debate will be if change will improve the industry or just enable new ‘failure’ paths.
Aircraft have certification requirements for design and build, but none for human operators (excepting interpretations for system interface in 25.1302, etc). Neither are there any requirements or control of management practice - only oversight of the outcome; the balance of safety and commerce needs to be better judged with respect to certification and aircraft operation.