Originally Posted by
neville_nobody
More like HR not doing their job properly. The FO had so many fails he had no business being in an aeroplane. The guy failed at least 3 endorsements and a line check. If that isn't a red flag for HR then I don't know what is.
Originally Posted by
Disso
The FO, given his egregious history of abysmal flying capacity and ineptitude (which I will paste below), had a documented track record of overreacting in unreasonable, irrational ways to 'stalling' states of aircraft by pushing the nose forward past any remotely reasonable degree of 'recovery'. He was documented to freak the F out when startled in precisely THESE type of situations, as has been documented. He should have never been in the seat that fateful day, and didn't deserve to.
Clipped from another forum:
Training Incompetency and Failures- 6/27/11 - Resigned from CommutAir for failing DHC-8 initial
- 8/13/12 - Resigned from Air Wisconsin for failing CRJ initial
- 4/22/14 - Failed EMB-145 Oral at Trans State Airlines
- 5/11/14 - Failed EMB-145 Type Rating at Trans States Airlines
- 5/17 - Failed EMB-175 Upgrade Attempt at Mesa Airlines
- 5/17 - Nearly failed FO Requal after failing upgrade attempt at Mesa Airlines
- 7/27/17 - Failed B-767 Oral at Atlas Air
- 8/1/17 - Unsat Judgement/Situational Awareness during FBS-1 at Atlas Air
- 8/5/17 - Failed DBS-5 at Atlas Air
- 8/11/17 - Almost Failed FFSI-1 at Atlas Air
- 8/31/17 - "Regression of Situational Awareness" during FFSI-3 at Atlas Air
- 9/22/17 - Failed B-767 Type Rating for "Very Low Situational Awareness", incomplete procedures, and exceeding limitations at Atlas Air
Past Training Notes (directly quoted from the NTSB Docket)...
Will the NTSB address these multiple training failures with a call for higher employment standards for transport category pilots? Or will they call for even more remedial training for those folks who can't do the job?
Originally Posted by
MarkerInbound
The Part 117 flight and duty time regulations put in place after the Colgan crash in 2009 were not applied to cargo operations due to a cost/benefit analysis. UPS basically said it was cheaper to have a crash once a decade killing two pilots than apply the proposed limits to their operations.
Similarly, is an occasional crash just the price we pay for overlooking a horrible training record in an effort to embrace a broader workplace recruitment demographic?
Things seemed to tighten up around the training building at many places after the Colgan crash for those 'frequent flyers' in the sims who never passed their checkrides without a lot of additional instruction. 709 rides were given by the FAA and a few of the legacy problem children quietly negotiated non-contractual early retirements and cash settlements in lieu of company provided training to get their tickets back.
The 1996 Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA) was intended to flag imposters and folks with training issues prior to hiring. Unfortunately, the current custom seems to be to offer a pilot being terminated for cause a chance to resign to avoid further litigation. The union and in many cases gender and ethnic advocacy groups cut a deal with the company and nothing adverse shows up on the PRIA record.