Originally Posted by
MechEngr
So why didn't the aural stall warning group, the stick shaker group, or the autopilot group ever notice that the AoA could be unreliable and force the development of a clear indicator to the pilots about the reason for all three of them dumping on the pilots at the same time?
In a word: profit.
Doing any sort of AoA comparison, would require a warning to the crew, and any new warning would have reduced the probability of a common type endorsement
without simulator time for the training. This was a key design criteria for the MAX,
no crew training beyond a short iPad course. Southwest included a $1 million per airframe penalty in the contract for the MAX if simulator training was required.
I don't know how much of the MAX threads you have read, the key name you want to search for is Rick Ludtke on this issue (
pprune.org search). He documents internal Boeing design mandate. There hasn't been a denial from Boeing as far as I am aware.
Yes, it is really that simple, to maximise sales and profit, every change had to be viewed through the prism of continued commonality.