Originally Posted by
Bend alot
Take Captain Sully's testimony and now we find greater than 50% of the pilots tested (knowing they would get) an AoA failure messed up the correct response and the fact that ALL 3 MCAS real life events took longer than (much) 10 seconds.
I feel at this stage you need some evidence to support your words.
It seems very clear the 737 MAX is a different beast to the 737 NG - simple fact if both crash aircraft were NG we would not be here.
Reading between the lines and other HF information 30 seconds would be a minimum but up to 2 minutes for a "average" pilot to start to correctly identify and carry out required memory items. They expect the memory items will not be carried out correctly in most cases.
The 10 seconds is for the independent determination of which set of instruments is reliable in a one-side stick shaker. I don't know how to tell if pilots are unable to feel control forces, but the ET302 flight indicates the PIC countered the MCAS input starting at 12 seconds after the MCAS input began. I think it was even less time for the Lion Air captain on the accident flight, sometimes as little as 5 seconds, cutting off MCAS mid-operation. What neither was primed to do was neutralize the forces and immediately shut off the trim system. They did not take 2 minutes to realize a need to retrim, though the ET302 PIC never neutralized the trim.
In the event of a depressurization event at altitude, 2 minutes to react can mean everyone is dead, so I am not buying 2 minutes of dithering when things go badly. I would like to see if they changed that list, because if they are looking at the stab indicator and saying "I don't think it's running away" because MCAS or an intermittent short let off for a few seconds, while hauling with 80 pounds on the control wheel to keep the nose up, then just maybe that is not a good way to write a procedure.
It's also the case that none of those in the test planted the plane, which is more evidence that something is wrong with the procedure as written. More detail about what deviations they made would be interesting. One thing that isn't necessary is to diagnose the reason for the trim problem. It's as likely to be caused by a wiring fault as something predictable and in neither case can the crew effect repairs mid-flight. So the emphasis should be on symptom relief.