Originally Posted by
MechEngr
There is no "runaway stabilizer." That term I specifically avoided because it's subjective. Sometimes the trim runs. And then stops. If it reaches the mechanical stop was it running away anymore? Nope, it has stopped running. But I bet the control forces are too high. So deal with what the real problem is and not make the pilot make some guess. If STS trims too much or too little, pilots input manual corrections. Was that runaway? What if the trim runs for more than a few seconds but the control forces are acceptable? Is that runaway?
It should take less than 10 seconds to determine what to do about the stall warnings and that is independent of control forces. In both crashes there was only one-side with the error and the performance of the plane was unchanged, indicating the warning was false. Am I mistaken or is that not part of all 737 training for 20+ years? How old is the NG series? The ET302 disaster unfolded over nearly 36 times that time span.
Tweak away, but the AD instructions were terrible with only vague actions to take and weak symptoms to determine it was the correct procedure.
Take Captain Sully's testimony and now we find greater than 50% of the pilots tested (knowing they would get) an AoA failure messed up the correct response and the fact that ALL 3 MCAS real life events took longer than (much) 10 seconds.
I feel at this stage you need some evidence to support your words.
It seems very clear the 737 MAX is a different beast to the 737 NG - simple fact if both crash aircraft were NG we would not be here.
Reading between the lines and other HF information 30 seconds would be a minimum but up to 2 minutes for a "average" pilot to start to correctly identify and carry out required memory items. They expect the memory items will not be carried out correctly in most cases.