Originally Posted by
MechEngr
All of that information was made available to Ethiopian Airlines prior to the crash and the Ethiopian pilots, the management, and Ethiopia's CAA all knew what training the pilots had. Since the plane was developed according to the requests of the customer base, the responability for it to be similar to the NG lies with those spending the money to buy them.
Blaming a single hole for the entire mess ignores the potential for another similar problem leading to similar results. Fix all the holes.
Can you please direct me to the information made available that states that pulling back on the control column no longer activates the electric trim switches (as it does in every other B737 model) located at the base of the column.
I recall a vague explanation of MCAS and a waffle of an AD that casually said carry out a run away trim if some of these things happens under some of these condition, oh and you might want to use the manual electric trim to get into trim first before hitting the cut out switches.
It is pretty clear Boeing and the FAA were trying thier best to play down the MCAS MAX issues after the first crash, even after the second. Recently it seems the FAA have woken up, but Boeing are still very much in denial of the problems leading up to MCAS and post 2 fatal crashes.
It seems nothing has changed at Boeing.