Originally Posted by
ApolloHeli
Curious to read about the accidents you're referring to?
Here in Europe it's very clear;
If you look at the EASA Type Rating list, it uses the following names for each variant:
-AS 350 B3) - Ecureuil
-AS 350 B3 Arriel 2B1) - Ecureuil
-AS 350 B3e) - Ecureuil
The B3 Arriel 2B1 (a.k.a. B3+ for short) and B3e only require familiarisation training between them, the B3 requires differences training. If someone simply uses "B3", I think it's safe to assume they mean "B3".
P.s. I believe the "B3+" may have come from Airbus initially (similar to their use of + for EC135's). Even if it's not official, it is clear which variant it refers to and is shorter than writing "...Arriel 2B1" every time.
Are you aware the factory training manual refers to the AS 350 B3 Arriel 2B as the "B3 Mod"?
As for the accidents, here's a start:
All three B3 variants incorporate a FADEC and an identical red GOV caution light. The light, requires similar but different responses in the 2B1 and 2D, but completely different in the 2B variant. In the 2B, the pilot must manually control engine RPM via a twist grip after the red GOV light illuminates. The 2B was initially produced with a red mechanical “slider” lever used to unlock the throttle range above the flight detent. After numerous incidents involving misunderstanding/misuse, the manufacturer removed the slider and replaced it with an electrical solenoid that automatically allowed access to the increased range. However, the solenoid was unreliable, subject to seizing and demonstrated to the factory to overheat and fail after a very short period of time. The solenoid mechanism went through another re-design to address these additional issues. A resulting alert service bulletin imposed preflight requirements and limitations upon the aircraft. Throughout this process, a bewildering array of conditional revisions to the flight manual and emergency service bulletins, all which required cross-referencing created confusion among operators and pilots, many of which were never aware of them. The manufacturer has a habit of addressing design flaws via procedural changes (examine the dual hydraulic option to unravel another human-factors nightmare). Here are a few accidents (in no specific order) related to 2B manual governor operations from which you can draw your own conclusions:
Report #1
Report #2
Report #3
Report #4
Report #5
Report #6