@pitts, of course, nobody wanted these disasters to happen, and I hope that the managers you know genuinely thought the system (MCAS) would work safely.
But:
A system with autonomous authority to move an extremely important flight control is added but not documented. There is apparently no way in the cockpit to switch it off. The system relies on the data from a single sensor. There seems to be no way of the system self-detecting a fault? The software changes were written by 3rd parties with no core experience of the original software code, and none of the original software writers were consulted. The AoA disagree warning light is an extra cost option. The hand THS trim wheels are smaller, increasing the human mechanical effort required to turn them manually. (Please correct me if any of these assertions are wrong).
With the best will in the world, this was surely poor management?, whatever the reasons for it were. And I for one cannot understand why such a pioneering and respected aircraft designer and manufacturer, such as Boeing, could have got themselves into this situation.