The article, Canada, and indeed this thread seem to be swinging us back to a period of analysis I'd have expected shortly after the second crash. We know full well the aircraft handling has to be 'augmented', and we thrashed through weeks of aerodynamic hardware suggestions that would obviate the need for MCAS. I think we concluded it would be hard to do a modification that did not degrade the aerodynamics, unless it was an active system: horribly expensive. A no-go. So we, as a fairly passionate community, seemed to swing back to fixing the MCAS fix. It was, perhaps is, an eloquent solution to an alarming post-design discovery. So what are people becoming so alarmed about at this (hopefully) late stage? It would be disastrous if MCAS, along with all the work so far, has to be scrapped in favour of some as yet unspecified device.
Boeing kept their control cable ethos for a long time, and seemingly extended it into the 737's MAX era as part of a hurried development that could carry the LEAP engine. If it had come from a clean-sheet design, I doubt it would have had conventional controls, or short legs. In other words, it would have been a different species . . . and too late.
It's about this time in Boeing's time-line that you should found your judgement. It's not just because of the immediate problem, but trying to get into the heads of senior management and imagine what they were thinking when the pressure was on. They had a chance to develop what would become the world's biggest seller - the commercial driving forces must have been incredible. It doesn't make them right, just incredible.
But let's consider a time when it's back in service and the 'average pilot' is coping with crosswind limits - and in the real world, rather more. That very expensive pod is frighteningly near the ground, even when the wing is neutral and the undercarriage under no great pressure. I'd feel very uneasy about contemplating the next ten or fifteen years never thumping it on, or perhaps catching it when a low-hour colleague, suddenly and quite inexplicably, aims it below the concrete. It's a multi-million dollar piece of kit that's just a little too near the ground for comfort. Furthermore, it has inherited one of the NG's lesser-known problems of hand cranking the stabilizer, plus, it's got a smaller wheel with which to haul 200 feet of cable, there and back. It starts life with some serious question marks hanging over it.
Boeing can't change horses now, they have to press on with what they're doing. It's horrible, but Hobson's choice. I agree that adding lines of code just adds to the fog but I can't see they've got any other option. I've posted before about being able to press a master cut-out at the first hint of a problem, and then reintroduce functions in diagnostic stages. It's simple, and clean, and the crew would be using time-honoured logic and solid wiring. However, I doubt the MCAS problem will be lifted out of the darkness of black boxes and pilots will remain blind to what's going on. As someone that always wanted a clear idea of what was going on, having the potential for another ghost in the machine is just not acceptable - unless I can disable it at a touch, without losing my electric trim for longer than it takes to reset that one channel.