PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 7th Nov 2019, 06:56
  #3787 (permalink)  
Captain Biggles 101
 
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Originally Posted by 568
I would say most of the posters here (including myself) would agree with your comments, great response.
Flight crew must be fully informed of flight characteristics in the event of an MCAS malfunction. The very fact the system was needed in the first place indicates that divergent pitch stability was a problem. Secondly, the fact that the system authority was increased further indicates problems.

Regulators must only allow the aircraft to return to service when system redundancy will allow safe flight throughout the flight envelope. AOA sensors do fail regularly, which i understand will render MCAS unserviceable, and in that event the aircraft needs to still be stable throughout the flight envelope. Crew must be aware of the consequences of AOA and/or MCAS failures, and simulators must reflect true aircraft behaviour in mandatory training for such events. Manual trim authority at all speed and configurations must be discovered and shared with flight crew for all 737 variants following these crashes in addition.

MCAS has turned out to be a powerful deadly system when it goes wrong. After such events, training must fully and accurately reveal in depth true aircraft behaviour and be trained for throughout the extremes of speed and pitch regimes to include electric and manual trim limitations.

It's time for regulators and Boeing to do the absolute maximum and reveal all data to flight crew that need to regain faith in such systems. It is also time for all flight crew to demand nothing short of full disclosure and proper training into all such issues now revealed by these crash investigations.
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