PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 28th Sep 2019, 15:00
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Tomaski
 
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Originally Posted by Checkboard
An MCAS event, however, happens after a stick shaker on the Captain's side, AND unreliable airspeed on the Captain's side - and with all of that going on pulling the pilots eyes away from the centre pedastal to the flying instruments the trim spins (with the noise of that covered by the stick shaker). The fact that this event took two experienced pilots to their deaths shows how different, difficult and dangerous the event is to diagnose in the time available.
Distraction was certainly an issue, just as it would have been an issue if there had been an engine failure amidst a cacophony of alarms. But part of the problem was also recognition of an ongoing stab trim issue. It should be noted that when hand-flying, the primary indication of the aircraft trim state is the feel of the controls and not reference to the trim wheel or stab position indicator. In all three of the MCAS malfunction incidents, the flying pilot was holding significant aft column control pressures and inputting a greater than normal amount of nose up trim, and yet there was either a delayed or lack of recognition that this might be a form of runaway stab trim. I am suggesting that if these flight crews had been exposed to runaway stab trim scenarios on a more regular basis in the sim (it is a "memory item" after all), just as they routinely practice engine-out scenarios, then their response to the MCAS malfunction might have been more prompt.
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