Originally Posted by
bunk exceeder
Random. I was being witty. But any pilot in command who uses the plane to hit the bushes shall submit, upon request, a written report to the administrator within 10 days. I don’t think bushwork appears in NTSB 830.... Of course you have to throw in Careless and Reckless....
Your C130A accident video, N130HP, on June 17, 2002 does not itself show careless or reckless operation. The video shows that the aircraft is essentially within its normal flight envelope.
The NTSB report suggests that the aircraft may have exceeded the ZFW earlier by up to 232lbs, but at the time of the accident, it was within limits. The report additionally opines that the aircraft may have exceeded the flap extended g limit of 2.0, however that is inconsistent with the wings level near level flight attitude in the video, the aircraft was within the speed limit for the 50% flap that was extended at that time. The report extensively covers the fatigue cracks on the wing center section, which compromised the structural integrity of the aircraft.
The NTSB report suggests that the aircraft was manoeuvring at 2.4g based on "video" at the time of the pull up that occurred before the wing failure, however, the video that has been released does not show a 2.4g pull pitch rate occurring for a speed of 146KCAS. Equally, at 91,000lbs, the actual load on the aircraft did not exceed the 2.0g load limit for the flap extension, being 75% of the permitted weight to be subject to a 2.0g load factor. The load factor itself is a limit, not the ultimate load necessary which would be a 3.0g load at 120,000+ lbs, which well exceeded the manoeuvring at the time of the failure. It is possible that in 2002 there was other video capturing the seconds prior to the pull up that the NTSB could base their statement on, but it is not the video that hit youtube.
Fatigue failures occur at 1.0g when they are ready. Two different aircraft types I have flown have had wing failures at 1.0g, and of course the Piper PA28RT201 loss at Daytona Beach with the CPL candidate and examiner occurred at 1.0g.
The early C130's had demonstrated potential failure of the CWS during hydrostatic testing that led to the inspection program for that area. The outer wing panels had their own issues. Significant fatigue cracking was found at the failure point so I am not sure that passing comment on reckless flying of the deceased has merit or is in good taste.
FYI, in 1994, N135FF, another C130A doing duty in fire fighting lost the left wing at the CWS in level, unaccelerated flight. The critical crack length for propagation was reported at about 1", the 2002 accident aircraft had a crack in excess of 12" prior to the failure on examination post accident.