PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 25th Aug 2019, 13:12
  #2028 (permalink)  
pilotmike
 
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 501
Originally Posted by GlueBall View Post
Without having to THINK, an experienced captain with sufficient manual flying skills would not need to know if MCAS, ordinary runaway stab trim or ambiguous autopilot stab trim inputs were causing the uncommanded nose-down trim. Such trim anomaly at low altitude would automatically trigger a self-preserving INSTINCTIVE response of stopping the trim-in-motion forward moving stabilizer wheel either with his knee, right thigh or right hand and simultaneously ordering the F/O to cut off the electric stab trim switches, or doing that by himself, while simultaneously clicking off the A/P and A/T.
And if the stick shaker wasn't the most prominent feature - shaking violently, and noisily - taking their full attention, warning as it does of too high angle of attack, which requires an immediate nose down input, then, yeah, probably they might have started to question what unknown system might be secretly moving a highly effective, primary control, without their knowledge, without them even knowing of its existence. That's a very big 'IF'. Just like if my auntie had a d!(k she'd be my uncle!

You are a perfect example of an armchair expert, now you know all the facts, with 20:20 hindsight. And dare I say it, quite likely with a strong vested interest. How very convenient to come on here and be the expert about what they all should have done.

Last edited by pilotmike; 25th Aug 2019 at 18:48.
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