The comprehensive safety review is widely seen as the definitive position for Europe, but apparently without question or consideration of the data origin or management. Data sources are reported, but not precisely how these are populated or formatted.
The headline risk for CAT is loss of control; a risk projection based on past accidents. Why should these accidents be allocated solely to LoC, particularly as only reflecting the outcome opposed to considering other contributing or initiating factors:- system / technical failure / certification process - A330, MD 80, CRJ; cf accidents listing page 151.
Interestingly, crew awareness, implied by adverse contributions from monitoring and managing technical failures, now appears in the overall risk portfolio, but this too relates to selected key risk areas.
Current safety interventions focus on the headline items - LoC avoidance and recovery, yet both depend on awareness, thence knowledge, and action. What emerges is a view of many interacting contributing factors - typical of wicked problems, yet the review presents a linear, mechanistic approach for safety problems which at best can only be controlled.
Taking the EASA review at face value could be misleading, particularly with simplistic solution-seeking strategies leading to over focus on issues which have been, or should be controlled by other means, i.e. A330 now has modified components, MD 80 - other aircraft alert unavailability of takeoff configuration warning, CRJ could update alerting software, certification processes should reflect the need for wider system reviews, and of course human involvement in all of these areas.