Originally Posted by
wonkazoo
IIRC each of the pilots flying initially gave up more ground to MCAS ANU stab movement than did the pilots who followed them. Thus each of those pilots upon taking control started in a deep hole that much closer to a literal vertical plummet if they let the trim run for too long, and the starting position of the trim when they took control was not basically neutral, but roughly halfway to the stops, meaning they were fighting far heavier control column forces from the first moment of control.
Except that is not what the FDR traces show. What the FDR traces show is that the pilots who successfully managed the malfunction kept the stab in roughly the same position by offsetting MCAS trim inputs with Main Electric Trim inputs. Even when the penultimate Lion Air 610 crew traded aircraft control from the Captain to the FO, you don't see any major excursions of the stab. In the Lion Air 610
accident flight, the Captain was flying and after the initial "surprise" when MCAS started doing its thing, he recovered nicely and maintained a relatively constant stab position with frequent Main Electric Trim inputs. He then handed the aircraft to the First Officer, and we see the decided inflection point in stab position where the FO effectively dug his own hole. Unfortunately, the Captain wasn't paying sufficient attention.
The ET302 flight was a whole different situation. The Captain got behind the trim and stayed behind until impact.
So again, what was the difference in the training, experience, and/or environment of the first three pilots and the last two that may have explained the dramatic difference in performance? We don't have the information (at least yet), but it is a reasonable line of inquiry.