Originally Posted by
yoko1
The intersection of a bad design and a poorly prepared crew are not mutually exclusive concepts. Despite Boeing's obvious series of blunders with the MAX design, some of the posters here, including myself, are rightfully concerned with the decline in crew training and certification standards worldwide. There have been a string of accidents/incidents that have nothing to do with the MAX that provide worrisome indications that airlines, abetted by manufacturers, continue to push for the minimal (and in theory less costly) levels of pilot training and experience. Ironically, one of the recurring complaints about the MAX development was how Boeing and their airline customers intentionally tried to minimize the differences training. Would it be too obvious to point out that insufficient training would show up as an inadequate crew response to a malfunction?
There is strong evidence of issues with crew performance in the Ethiopian accident, and some lessor but still problematic issues at Lion Air, likely a result of the training and operations culture at these airlines. This concern is largely getting a pass because of the overwhelming focus on Boeing. It is not a case of "blaming the pilots" when someone points out that these pilots were set up to fail by airlines that did not give them the training or tools to manage a serious, yet recoverable, malfunction.
So at the end of the day, the MAX will either be fixed or grounded, but the issues with crew training and certification will remain unless they are addressed as well. I don't really see how ignoring the problem makes for safer flight operations.
Yoko, the matter of flight crew training and standards is a general matter of concern, across nationalities, ™all are punished™, as Escalus said. The fix attempted by the FAA following the embarrassment of Colgan is anaemic at best and detracting resources from.efective training at worst. The industry has issues. Nevertheless, the JT and ET crews were placed in positions that were unreasonable as first disclosed, and each revelation deepens that concern. The crew competency necessary to reliably survive the events with the knowledge the crews had at that time is not that trained by airlines, selected by HR, a standard obliged by the national regulators, ICAO or Iata, nor is it evident that passengers are prepared to pay to assure such standards
The rules require unexceptionalism.... And the planes issues definitely exceeded any reasonable level of that criteria.
Those cockpits were difficult environments in order to cope with what amounts to compound critical failures. It remains unreasonable to blame the messenger of the systemic failings that deregulation naturally result in