Originally Posted by
meleagertoo
And as such, why is it really so necessary to inform pilots of this system? There is no specific control over it, just the generic runaway trim procedure.
Isn't that exactly the problem (next to MCAS operation relying on a single AoA vane naturally)?
Obviously, in case of the 737 MAX MCAS accidents there was a lack of a clean manual override path similar to that present in case of the 737 NG STS and/or allegedly the MCAS variant installed on the KC-46 tanker where, in both cases, the automatic trim procedure could be overridden by manual column input? Had that been in place in case of the 737 MAX MCAS along with appropriate pilot training and full disclosure of the new system(s) and changes, I dare say we would not be having this lengthy thread here.
Wasn't Boeing's design philosophy supposed to be "pilot can always override automation"? And why was it so poorly respected in this instance as opposed to the cases when similar systems were introduced by Boeing in the past ? These are the questions one truly needs to raise to assess the "what went wrong here?" conundrum.