737D;
your posts indicate that the crew of the flights were less than competent in essence, however, you also suggest that the training standards are deficient. One specific on competency is your statement that you would respond in the event that these crews encountered by recognising the problem, identifying the cause and completing the action within "5 seconds".
If I recall correctly, the "5 second" remark was specifically in reference to a certain set of steps on the runaway stab trim checklist. Apparently there is a "demo" video on YouTube that gives the impression that it takes longer, and someone was under the impression that this length of time was one of the things working against the crew. I was simply pointing out that it could have been done quicker. In another post, however, I also pointed out
that the crew could take all the time they needed to get the aircraft back to neutral trim as long
as one of the pilots was, yes, FLYING THE AIRCRAFT and managing the trim using the yoke switch.
I agree that training needs to be lifted around the industry, we don't necessarily need more training, we need training that is not wasteful fo the resources that exist, as they are to day. We are currently governed by the aviation industries own version of political correctness, A.K.A. as SMS, and QA. In order to give a simplified box ticking exercise to regulators and managers, we come up with matrices and checklists that are fantastic for showing compliance, but, that is all. There is no closure of the loop on the fact that the crew may comply with a procedure or policy that in itself increases operational risk, or is impossible to do as it conflicts with the real world. The other sort of failure (think false negatives, false positives) arise when the boxes get ticked, but the impact of implementation is not observed. Our roles, policies and procedures are developed usually as bandaids on top of bandaids to reduce the risks of something, either real risk, or showing compliance (another form of risk - commercial). In all cases, however it is unlikely that the 200 hr pilot sitting in the RHS seat of the plane was the cause of the competency issues, he/she cannot be other than the logical outcome of what the industry has accepted as a good solution to unfettered growth (a cancer in effect, sounds good until the consequences start being felt).
I fully agree with this.
A final thought: The crews encountered an unusual trim case, the checklist is for a runaway trim, yet the problem did not actually present as such, there was a trim error that occurred, but the trim responded normally to the crews trim inputs, and then after a period of time was anomalous again. That is not a simple set of facts to decipher in short order. Given their time over, I expect that the crew would follow your advice and act within 5 seconds and cure the ills of the world.
Again, I think you are reading to much into that "5 second" comment. I agree that, at least to the Lion Air crew, this presented itself as a novel malfunction. There has been some questions raised about how clearly the post-Lion Air AD and related information was transmitted to the Ethiopian flight crews. However, I will also point out that in the history of aviation,
there will always be someone who gets to experience a malfunction for the first time. That is why I keep harping on the mantra (I think you know it by now
)
The mantra
assumes that a flight crew may be presented with a novel situation that will require time to sort out. And I will say again, if either of the accident crews had done nothing but apply the mantra, particularly the "Trim the Aircraft" part, they would have bought themselves sufficient time -
basically until fuel exhaustion - to figure out what was going on. That is way more than 5 seconds.