Ancient Mariner: All this grandstanding makes me wonder if some of you have been in an emergency, a real emergency?
I've been fortunate/unfortunate enough to have been in a few, albeit maritime, not aviation related.
Everytime I was surprised to see "highly trained professionals", and I mean highly trained, we had realistic training once a week for these eventualities, totally break down and be unable to function. I not talking 30 seconds, 90 seconds, but unable, period.
Aviation is of course a totally different ballgame. 
Per
You are correct, aviation is (or should be) a different game. During the selection, training and ongoing check rides during one's career as a professional pilot the individual is constantly evaluated and tested. In an ideal world, if they don't cut the mustard they are cut loose - I have seen this happen a few times but unfortunately I have seen too many marginal pilots given complimentary passes on various sim rides, line checks, etc. Unions fighting back is probably why some of the marginal pilots get through; I suppose the corporation also calculates the probability of an event, the probability of two weak pilots being paired together and decides to take that risk. I would submit, however, that any one that totally breaks down and unable to function would not (or should not) hold a commercial pilot license.
As far as emergencies, I have had plenty...three engine failures, a couple of hydraulic system failures, blown tires, etc. I am no hero, I just do what I have been trained to do.
During a few day hiatus while on vacation the discussion pivoted to human factors which is undoubtedly an issue and particularly the "startle factor". I know of few emergency situations where the voice of a lovely lady comes over the speaker and says "Standby for xxxx" with xxx being a UAS, stab trim runaway, engine fire, etc. The startle factor is always there and it is accounted for in the certification of the aircraft, i.e. crew recognition and reaction time.
But after that "startle factor" period is over, it's time to get down to work and deal with the problem, usually with an emergency checklist and sometimes without (double engine failure, volcanic ash (BA flight in the 1980's), a complete hydraulic failure (UAL Sioux City), etc.). It is the job, the responsibility, of the professional aviator to react to the problem startle factor or not. If the professional pilot as an individual cannot get past the startle factor and focus on the problem and deal with it, then they should not have a license or type rating. If professional pilots collectively cannot manage the startle factor and deal with emergencies anymore then it's time to shut down the industry entirely as the traveling public cannot be guaranteed their safety in the even of an emergency.
Yes, there was a startle factor at lift-off on the two accident flights and one incident flight. In the case of the incident flight, they dealt with the startle factor, called for the UAS checklist, controlled the speed of the aircraft (i.e. flew the aircraft) and that allowed them to diagnose the MCAS issue when the flaps were raised. The dealt with MCAS by flying the damn airplane (trim and speed control) with a little help from a "friend" and carried on to destination with the stick shaker, UAS and manual trim. Bravo!
Yet the accident crews had the same startle factor and couldn't even get to first base, i.e. UAS drill. And they had almost two minutes to execute that simple, memory checklist. And had they done just that, they would not have been racing around at 340 kts, making manual trim and hand flying with nose down trim impossible due to control forces. Instead, they could have manhandled that aircraft while they sorted out the trim including using the manual trim wheel and could have flown all day long in that condition, just like the Lion Air incident flight.
As a professional aviator (and a person that flies in the back of aircraft a lot), it is my expectation that the aviators I work with or whom I have entrusted by life and that of my family to be competent enough to get over the startle factor and do what they are expected to - fly the damn aircraft and deal with the emergency. In the case of the MAX, the emergencies are known and have published procedures. This was not a double engine failure, volcanic ash, total hydraulic failure but a simple UAS. That is not asking too much.
As 737 Driver and others have been stating on this thread, this may sound harsh and hard-ass but that it is the professional responsibility of the a professional aviator. There is no denying that MCAS needs rework and there is not disagreement about that. But what we are arguing is that aircraft do have system failures and startle factor is a fact-of-life, but the pilots must have the training and experience to deal with it. They have to wear the big boy pants because they are the last line of defense.
As I mentioned a couple of thousands of post ago, the airline industry has been whistling past the graveyard for many years but now the chickens are coming home to roost (sorry about the mixed metaphors). It just takes some unexpected event now to cause an aircraft to crash - MCAS, no ILS approach available (Asiana SFO), an engine failure (ATR 42 TPE), a go-around (Emirates 777 DBX) and airplanes crash when trained and competent crews could have and should have avoided the loss of life and aircraft.
These events should be a call to action by the entire industry - manufacturers who have hithertofore relied on experienced and trained pilots to save the day, regulators who are not demanding higher standards of pilot training and experience (i.e. actually hand flying and not watching the autopilot), airlines (for the same reasons) and pilot unions who have to own part of the responsibility for insuring their members uphold high professional standards which may mean actually hand flying aircraft.
Boeing erred with MCAS but the fault for these accidents are the result of failure of the players noted above.