Originally Posted by
A0283
Hard to keep up ...
But this comes from the Wall Street Journal:
Boeing test pilots lacked key details of 737 MAX flight-control system Boeing limited the role of its own pilots in the final stages of developing the 737 MAX flight-control system implicated in two fatal crashes, departing from a longstanding practice of seeking their detailed input, people familiar with the matter said.
As a result, Boeing test pilots and senior pilots involved in the MAX’s development didn’t receive detailed briefings about how fast or steeply the automated system known as MCAS could push down a plane’s nose, these people said.
I already posted this article link in one of the parallel threads, and since the overall story is quite profound. Even though most of the information is not new, it is worth skimming, to be reminded of some of the details:
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/2/18...error-mcas-faa
Summary:
- Mistakes began nearly a decade ago when Boeing was caught flat-footed after its archrival Airbus announced a new fuel-efficient plane that threatened the company’s core business. It rushed the competing 737 Max to market as quickly as possible.
- In developing the Max, Boeing not only cut corners, but it touted them as selling points for airlines. Since the 737 Max was the same plane type as its predecessors, pilots would only need a 2.5-hour iPad training to fly its newest iteration.
- MCAS is the new software system blamed for the deadly Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes. But its failure in both crashes was the result of Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration’s reluctance to properly inform pilots of its existence or to regulate it for safety.
- The FAA has admitted to being incompetent when regulating software, and, as a policy, it allows plane manufacturers to police themselves for safety. Nowhere in its amended type certification of the 737 Max is MCAS mentioned.
- Even still, Boeing only recommends a 30-minute self-study course for pilots on MCAS, rather than additional simulator or classroom instruction.
- Despite the two crashes, neither Boeing nor the FAA believes they’ve done anything wrong. A Boeing spokesperson said the company believes the system is still “a robust and effective way for the FAA to execute its oversight of safety.”
Nothing specific to test pilots, but these comments are telling:
And many pilots felt that, for the first new 737 in over 20 years, Boeing seemed to be oddly reluctant to prep them for it.
Captain Laura Einsetler, who’s flown for over 30 years, including on 737s, considers an all-computer-based course to be completely inadequate as an introduction to a new airplane.
“I don’t have the schematics. I don’t have the cockpit panels. I don’t have an instructor that I can ask questions to,” she says. “You’re hoping that the first time you see the Max is on a nice clear day. But sometimes it’s not, and you’re showing up at night or in bad weather into an airplane that has all these changes.”
The subtext: pilots were on a need-to-know basis about MCAS, and until the Lion Air crash, Boeing felt that they hadn’t needed to know.
Einsetler strongly disagrees. “We need to have the understanding and knowledge of how everything works on the jet, so that we can command the jet to do what we need it to do, not just be along for the ride,” she says.
“Not a lot of information got out there in a timely fashion,” concurs Juan Browne, a 777 pilot with over 40 years of flying experience. “It almost makes me wonder, did Boeing engineers themselves really understand how much power and authority they built into this system?”