Originally Posted by
GordonR_Cape
Very lengthy and moderately detailed article just popped up on my newsfeed... Typical paragraph, relevant to this thread:
So had anyone checked, they might have flagged MCAS for one of several reasons, including its lack of redundancy, its unacceptably high risk of failure, or its significant increase in power to the point that it was no longer just a “hazardous failure” kind of system.
Great article. And, your quote goes to the heart what I think is a very significant question: is MCAS software now level A, given the proven consequences of its failure ? Given no one has (yet) answered, I am suspecting no one knows?
I wonder if Boeing are arguing that now it has 2 sensors, it’s failure is no longer catastrophic. But that would appear to be incorrect logic. It’s
chance of failing is less, but the
consequence of failing is still the same. Under the other argument, nothing would ever be classified as catastrophic, because anything in that category would be mitigated to a reduced level. Hence, nothing would be level A software, which is clearly not the case.
Takwis gives a great description of what happens when software isn’t as robust as it should be....