I think this extract from the book illustrates well where the likes of Chug and I are coming from. Look at the dates and ask yourself who briefed Adam Ingram and Bob Ainsworth. Precisely the same prior direct warnings (i.e. face to face, at 2 Star level) were provided that could have prevented (e.g.) Tornado ZG710, Sea Kings XV650 & 704, Kajaki Dam (it isn't just about aircraft) and many others. The point is, it's still happening. As an aside, this makes a nonsense of the claim 'We've asked some difficult questions. That's why we were created' (MAA Technical Director, 13 July 2014). No you didn't. Junior staff in MoD pointed out the failings and provided the answers - from 1988 (the point at which I believe the failings became systemic). DFS listed the same failings from 1992-98. Haddon-Cave in 2009. Lord Philip in 2011, although obliquely. A succession of Coroners. Internal MoD auditors. Members of the public. This isn't just a couple of old hands shouting from the sidelines on an internet forum. The book tries to make sense of voluminous data already in the public domain, supplemented by what was omitted in official reports. And money isn't an issue. In each case it was faster, cheaper and better to do the right thing in the first place.
I recall saying in an old thread that it would take the MAA 10 years to implement Haddon-Cave's recommendations. It's almost 10 years now..... And then everything regressed 20 years after the Cunningham case last year. (But that's another book).
In my submission to the (Nimrod) Review, I stated:‘The causes of this accident are rooted in MoD’s systematic failure to implement the regulations designed to ensure airworthiness, despite many warnings of the consequences over a long period.
On 15 September 2005 I wrote to my MP, who passed the letter to Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces: “In my experience, this ambivalent attitude towards safety is compelling evidence of a lack of robustness in the application of procedures within the MoD, which I have known to result in critical safety problems”.
On 17 May 2007 Mr Ingram replied: “Mr Hill has stated that although the MoD has a robust airworthiness regulatory framework it is not applied robustly. I contend that the framework is applied robustly”. (His emphasis). Please note the delay between my letter and Ingram's reply. Nimrod XV230 crashed on 2 September 2006.
I tried again, to his successor Bob Ainsworth MP. “I contend that cultural traits and organisational practices which are contrary to sound engineering practice and detrimental to safety have been allowed to develop. Effective communication of critical safety information, and intelligent debate, is stifled. There is a lack of integrated management and oversight across programs and often an informal and uninformed chain of command and decision-making process exists outside the formal airworthiness and safety delegations”. On 2 August 2008, Minister repeated his position’.
Messrs Ingram and Ainsworth were, tragically, proved wrong. Neither has apologised, and no action has been taken against those who misled them.