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Old 27th Apr 2019, 16:00
  #4445 (permalink)  
double-oscar
 
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Derby
Posts: 25
Originally Posted by HundredPercentPlease View Post
Getting a bit bored of multiple posts slagging off these pilots.

We get it. You think they were sub-standard. You would have used your greater "airmanship" to keep the basic parameters in line and therefore the aircraft flying.

Your lack of appreciation of human factors in a real scenario with real line pilots in the real world is what you should address. After-the-event-heroism is ever so easy.

My suggestion is to slice the event up into small time slices. In each slice - look at the information presented, the probable solution, the required actions and the workload. Then in the next slice, base your model on a modification of the previous slice - increasing or decreasing the factors, and extrapolating the data flows. So if it starts with a stall indication, then keep the "it's a stall" flowing, until (given the workload estimate) the information is sufficient to demonstrate to the pilots that it's not a stall. Doing this, you will discover that the pilot with reduced workload will process new information earlier.

In my model, the captain wanted to get the thing cleaned up, then reduce the workload, then work out what was wrong. They cleaned up - he used the a/p to reduce the workload, and as they were starting to diagnose the aircraft bit them. His workload reduced his SA (along with the stick shaker) to a critical point. The pilot failed due to excess workload, not due to lack of "airmanship".

But your model is not what is contained in the QRH for the Boeing 737. There are actions for a stick shaker on lift-off and neither involve engaging the auto-pilot or retracting the flaps. One would hope any pilot flying the aircraft would be familiar with this. Certainly in EASA countries, jet upset and stall recovery has been one of the hot topics and recurrent training for the past few years has certainly included elements to improve pilot recognition and recovery from such events. To focus on MCAS is wrong, there is much more to these accidents than that and 737driver is right, pilot training is one of them.
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