Originally Posted by
rog747
This is unprecedented in our industry in many years - Last seen when the DC-10 was in service 40 years ago - Also long before social and digital media, and the likes of Pprune and YouTube and the freedoms of getting information quickly.
I remember the DC-10, though I was a child at the time. There are some similarities and some differences. The cargo door design was closest to the MCAS situation today. A poorly engineered design was certified; after the first accident, the problem was discovered, but there was no grounding order, and no AD issued, due to a close relationship between the heads of the FAA and MD. Following the second nearly identical disaster, there was a congressional investigation into the FAA's certification of the design, and an AD was issued mandating changes.
The other big issue with the DC-10 was the improvised maintenance procedures at AA that were the cause of the AA 191 disaster, though that accident did also reveal some design flaws, as did the UAL 232 accident ten years later.
In none of the major DC-10 crashes and incidents could the pilots have employed some simple recognition and standard procedures to save the aircraft. Yet despite significant physical damage and loss of flight controls, in the case of AA 96 the pilots were able to return and land using the limited working control surfaces that they still had. And the pilots were able to bring UAL 232 back to the runway using only engine thrust of the two wing engines after the uncontained failure of the tail engine caused total loss of hydraulic pressure. I consider both of those incidents to be beyond Sully-level performances by the pilots, yet nobody could have realistically blamed them if they had failed. Had PPRuNE existed at that time, I don't think anyone would be here posting "Why didn't they just perform the memory items for the cargo door blowing out and collapse of the cabin floor onto the control cables." And yet in those two cases the crews were able to maintain awareness, figure out what still worked and what didn't, and fly the aircraft with what they had.
As a (now grown adult) passenger, I don't have a loss of confidence in the MAX. They are not blowing out doors, or shedding engines. They are 100% physically intact and completely flyable, even with the flawed MCAS system, which is now understood, and will be fixed. I don't blame the pilots so much as I recognize the difference that
in theory it seems that it should have been possible to run a few simple memory procedures, flip a few switches, and fly back and land. I don't see exceptional piloting skill being required there, in contrast to what some of the DC-10 crews were facing.
Whether the public at large will see it that way, especially given today's outrage-oriented media, remains to be seen.