Originally Posted by
HundredPercentPlease
I disagree. Immediately (at the end of the rotation) the aircraft was indicating a stall, and so the crew performed a stall recovery (lowered AoA by reducing pitch and increasing speed).
It was
three memory checklists:
- Stall recovery.
- UAS recovery.
- Runaway stab (during the UAS recovery and aurally masked by the stick shaker).
The evidence is that 3 is too many - unless possibly you have a third pilot to monitor and assist.
I have a feeling that the Ethiopian captain may have engaged the autopilot as a pre-considered homebrew anti-MCAS strategy. Autopilot in = no MCAS risk.
If one rolls down the runway with both engines providing the advertised thrust (94%), the airspeed cross check at 80 indicates no disparity, and the aircraft is rotated normally at Vr with both airspeed indicators working normally then rotated to a climb attitude and the engines continue to turn and burn, then any erroneous stall warning has to be ignored and treated as such. That is why manufacturers provide nominal pitch/power settings to insure a stall free climb or cruise while it gets sorted out. In fact, I had the same stick shaker after take-off many years ago on the 737-200 after lift-off; yes, it gets your attention but if the attitude of the aircraft is ok and the engines are running fine then it cannot be a bona fide stall but an erroneous indication.
If the crew thought it was a stall, then the stall recovery should have been implemented - it was not and in fact they (Ethiopian) tried to engage the autopilot, a definite no-no in a stall.
So even setting aside the MCAS issue later, sadly this all points to training and experience to handle a pretty basic emergency. And that points back to the airline and the CAA who are responsible for that.