I am aware of the procedure but was never taught it on type training on the 737 conducted under FAA.
Simply, there is no manner by which such a heroic technique complied with the Type Certification requirements under Part 25. The rules do not permit the application of exceptional force, technique or skill, and any need to have 2 pilots apply force at the same time is grossly unacceptable, breaching the FAA’s own prohibition on control inputs by more than one pilot.
As the aircraft often flies with a seat unoccupied when nature calls, it would be incompatible to have a flight condition where both pilots must be able to have inputs onto controls at all times in flight.
The 737 is grandfathered to revisions of the rules in the 60’s but the basic rationales have not changed that much.
If the the plane has any condition that may necessitate rock n’ roll as a recovery, using both pilots, then I would imagine that it needs a type review and rectification of the underlying design deficiency.
How on on earth would it be acceptable to have a passenger transport with a known need for exceptional training outside of the training for CPL or ATPL/ATP, requiring both pilots simultaneous inputs on the flight controls, necessitating a ballistic flight path, where the pax are not required to be restrained at ALL times, I.e., whenever the flaps are retracted....
it it is not acceptable under the rules, and the plane has been known to have this characteristic for how long?
I’ve flown flown the 737 out way beyond VMO MMO Under controlled conditions, and while careful about tuck considerations, was not aware of a “jack stall” potential on the aircraft. That is troubling.
25.143 provides the general handling qualities requirements, including statements on skill, limit of force on elevator to 70 lbs short term, 2?hands, and 10 lbs long term.
25.255 covers mid trimmed cases, and potentially lets the OEM off the hook, but places the regulations in question. Recovery with a force of 120 lbs should be shown for a maximum runaway trim of 3 seconds of trim motion for the conditions of flight. MCAS action exceeds the 3 seconds, but the OEM is only required to show acceptable characteristics with 3 seconds of trim motion from in trim conditions, which is clearly inadequate to protect the aircraft operation.