Originally Posted by
CurtainTwitcher
It was stated earlier in the thread the reasoning behind the single sensor design was specifically so no AoA error could be detected. A dual sensor approach would allow an AoA error to be detected, which would necessitate the warning to be presented to the crew, and that would potentially require additional training. The design mandate for the MAX that there would be no requirement for simulator time to save the airlines money. Even the test pilot was unaware of the full MCAS was single channel.
Think they need to revisit part 25.671, then part 25.672, as a stability augmentation system must have "a warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for ANY failure in the stability augmentation system or in ANY OTHER AUTOMATIC OR POWER OPERATED SYSTEM WHICH COULD RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITION IF THE PILOT WERE NOT AWARE OF THE FAILURE"
(caps inserted)
At base level this MCAS is just an augmentation system is it not?
In my view, it does not comply with the basic certification requirement above, and someone in Boeing knows this, software alone won't fix it.
Ttfn