Originally Posted by
AndyJS
It is precisely the same human factors problem. Overload a flight crew with a lot of warnings a real cognitive overload, and go from understimulated to overstimulated in a second a startle effect, followed by 'automation surprise' "what's it doing??"
I know that there are considerable efforts to check the warning systems that the crew have to deal with. However, if you start doing a parallel cognitive walkthrough of each set of task requirements for example following an NNC while aviating and reading the various instruments and hearing the alarms voice and sounds and dealing with the haptics like stick shakers and loads on control columns, while being shouted at by the other crew member, then it will immediately be apparent that some cognitive channels are overloaded. For example a simple non-stress test for you - read this post and at the same time recite a well known set of memory items and have someone tell you something. You will not be able to do all three because they all use the same 'verbal' reasoning 'cognitive channel' - it's why you have a sanitized flight deck on approach.
As with AF447, these two Max crashes should inform the future cockpit human factors and alarm development