Originally Posted by
PEI_3721
Ian W, # 2076, patplan # 2071,
Take care when attempting to compare failure reports with supposed accident scenarios; local investigation or narratives might not have the same level of expertise or understanding.
Furthermore, it would be unwise to make direct comparison with recent accidents, because without knowledge of the source of failure (where did the erroneous AoA originate), everything else is assumption.
My reading of the other events cannot identify any connection with AoA or any other parameter associated with MACS.
That is just the point.
I would have expected a large number of 737 pilots to start quoting what happened when they get an AoA mismatch and unreliable airspeed. There is no large number - despite everyone piling on (with some justification) that reliance on a single AoA was not good engineering. It would appear that AoA subsystem failures in the earlier variants of the 737 are rare enough to be considered highly improbable and that would be added to the 'in any case a repeatedly running MCAS can be handled as with any other trim runaway'.
So the question remains what is different about the Max AOA subsystem that makes it less reliable that the earlier 737s?