Originally Posted by
GlobalNav
And oversight is not as easy as it looks on paper. It gets reduced from technical examination to paper audits, turns engineers into clerks, and insulates the “overseers” from the technical details. Battles rage over the items to be retained by the FAA and can be beaten down by FAA management that is more sensitive to “customer” complaints.
Global Nav, I agree.
However these actives should not remove the need for the regulator to have sufficient understanding of the system to judge normal and non-normal operations, and then compare with crew standards and training.
Beware the assumptions in that.
Unfortunately many systems are now so complex and intertwined, only the manufacturer has the ability to understand the larger picture. Aspects of complex accident investigations may be delegated to the manufacturer, but at least their findings have to be submitted to the investigative group for peer review.
In part, this problem should be manageable with partnership, trust, and mutual understanding of design and certification processes, including safety culture. Perhaps the other overseas authorities should play a greater part in the oversight and review processes.
What happens when these aspect fail; who investigates these features?