PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Boeing 737 Max Software Fixes Due to Lion Air Crash Delayed
Old 12th Mar 2019, 16:39
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Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: florida
Age: 81
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Salute!

The problem, Wolf and Jimtx, is that the specific indications/symptoms of erroneous MCAS activation are not all that clear. Not like basic runaway trim that most pilots recognize right away, huh?
The AoA sensor failure or being FUBAR activates the stick shaker, right? Then an audible warning, right? Then does it also activate the unreliable speed warning ? GASP!
There could be some back door paths for the various kludge boxes ( STS, feel system, etc) to disguise the obvious MCAS activation of down trim then 5 seconds before next down trim by presenting the crew with all kindsa warning lights and tones.

I have no problem with many crews not realizing that the MCAS is FUBAR because the down trim goes way with just a tap on the trim switch. So 5 seconds later, just as they were going thru another procedure or making a radio call the damned thing does it gain and he beeps the trim and it goes away. You can clearly see this on both of the Lion Air plots. And I also believe that the "flight before" crew suspected STS failure or something other than MCAS. So they just pulled a Luke Skywalker trick and went manual.
The problem with the scenario is that you only have 5 seconds to disable electric trim before the bugger starts again. The CRM and decision of a trim system malfunction all come into play. I think thatI could have set up this scenario back last summer and most crews would have crashed.
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