Originally Posted by
quentinc
and whilst you have two hands on the yoke, the FAA directive to follow the trim runaway memory checklist, requires you to operate the guarded stabilizer trim cut out switches. Maybe the FO can do this. Once done, you still have the aircraft out of trim but now your trim switches on the yoke wont work. You need to shout at the copilot, to operate the trim wheels manually. If way out of trim, he's got plenty of spinning to do. Too much speed? Will reducing thrust result in more pitch down or give more time for the copilot to save the aircraft?
Yes and the poor souls at Lion Air were likely focused on another memory item checklist, ultimately one that didn't rectify the issue.
The FAA Boeing Bulletin might seem simple in hindsight, but with a cacophony of noise and spurious alerts and call outs, it is not too hard to imagine a sense of overwhelm.
Have Boeing unknowingly introduced a single point of failure into the aircraft?
That the SWA 737MAX fleet was 'fitted' with a Boeing factory option displaying AOA on both PFD, not just the Captain's HUD is suggestive that at least some airlines consider that indications need cross checking.
The sense one gets is that the pilots with the AOA displayed can cross-check and likely the display would assist a rapid diagnosis of the issue.
Indeed the early QF orders of the 738, were destined for another customer and had the option already 'fitted' , all additional aircraft have the same indication.
Perhaps it is time Boeing 'fitted' it to all 737 MAX? Or are their lawyers suggesting to do so implies a problem?
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...737-max-fleet/
The FAA look the odd one out as increasingly a risk aversion mindset takes hold.
Regulatory capture it may well be, but other aircraft have been grounded for a lot less, all in the name of safety.
How much short open interest in BA (NYSE) ? How much of an eye has the regulator on the economics?
That this event occurred in the same phase of flight is the concern. Until they categorically rule out that the MCAS system was at play here, the aircraft ought be sitting idle on the ground.