Lack of redundancy!
Gums
I have to say I enjoy Your analyses.
In the airliner world there is two camps: Airbus and Boeing.
And very few that has ever been in both, at least the ones posting here.
In the Boeing camp there is the sub group of 737 crew that are under the illusion that they fly a modern Boeing.
It is no such thing, as a matter of fact it is a 1956 707 flight deck frame and parts of a 727, that made it a great plane in 1967 when put on the market. And for money making still a great plane, but it was not made for scale up as was the A320.
And the systems was basic. No triple redundancy as generals demanded in modern designs.
BUT , from there to patching on a very forceful MCAS system WITHOUT telling anyone, depending in a SINGLE AOA vane input is in hindsight incompetent if not criminal.
As You say, lets cut the poor crew some slack. As for Boeing , non! They let us down!
It now looks like a fact that if the crew does NOT use the Cut Out Switches, the outcome is most likely a loss of control.
( I could argue that if I forgot this I would aggressively, re-trim back to in-trim condition and eventually select F1 and be surprised that I solved the problem and returned to land!? Boeing argues I would do the do the cut out!)
All they had to do was add a second AOA vane and this would never happened , but in true Boeing 737 style it is all about milking that old cow. ( I have to say from the 757/767 up they have great planes)
I love the 737-800, but she has some quirks that would defiantly be designed out if it was new.
The other day a saw a short warning that a 737 operator had some airspeed unreliable instances , one was with birdstrike and the AOA vane was damaged. This was a 737-800 so no MCAS, and now we know a bit more, but it will happen again on the MAX and Boeing better have it right as next time , if fatal she is grounded.
Lets hope we get a quick safe and REDUNDANT fix.
Regards
Cpt B
PS
Was there an Engineer on the jump seat or not? Anyone?
Ds