The point I try to make, unsuccessfully it seems, is that the root causes from the 80s still persist. Yes, the decision to waste money and make savings at the expense of safety was made by AMSO (RAF), at a time before he had control over practical airworthiness money or the civilian staff who were MoD's corporate knowledge and expertise. Things got far worse when that changed in 1991.
MoD, not just the RAF, has never recovered. Yes, senior RAF officers in AMSO railed against those who complained, threatening dismissal (Dec 1992). But just as many, if not more, senior staff in MoD(PE), then DPA, DLO and now DE&S followed suit. Few actually knew the subject; something that is evident on pprune - which is not a criticism, because very few servicemen are expected to ever work in this area. That was ok until the aforementioned CDP ruled neither should civilians. (July 1996). He wasn't RAF - he was a submariner, which tends to be an RN job. The civilians I mentioned supported him. Not because they agreed, but because he was their boss. Common enough, but they went too far when declaring airworthiness optional, and false declarations could be made. Those who have the papers relating to this glider case should study them with that thought in mind. Have false declarations been made? Oh yes, by both the RAF and DE&S. Perhaps inadvertently, but that would again highlight they are in the wrong job. As Engines said some time ago, they are signing something way below their paygrade, that they know SFA about.
I fully understand the ACO experts here focusing on gliders. What has happened is appalling. I merely ask you to analyse the root causes. You will find they were reported to ACAS and the RAF Chief Engineer in 1992-98 by RAF Directors of Flight Safety. (Why did CAS ignore his personal appointee?) To PUS in 1996 by the Director of Internal Audit. And to around two dozen senior civilian staff in MoD(PE), and a raft of Ministers. Not one lifted a finger.
Always remember, gliders were the easy target, to deflect from the real problem. Also remember, the same part of DE&S could not find a valid safety case in 2012, after the XX177 accident. That, as Chug says, it didn't know the basic regulations and issued a rogue technical instruction. That, maintainers were instructed not to implement mandated servicing instructions on a safety critical escape system. Killing Flt Lt Cunningham. To the best of my knowledge, it wasn't an RAF signature on that bit of paper. (It's redacted). But the MAA, DE&S, RAF and RN attended the meeting that made the decision. These are, or were, the people in charge of gliders. Yer man JM doesn't feature.